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THE EU MIGRATION CRISIS 
 
 JUSTIN BORG-BARTHET* and CAROLE LYONS** 
  
Things fall apart…. The centre cannot hold1 
 
A. Introduction 
 
On 9 September 2010, the body of a man who had fallen from a BA flight to Heathrow was 
discovered in a wealthy, west London suburb.2 It is hard to pinpoint any one precise origin of 
the migration crisis currently unfolding in Europe, but the migrant who fell from the sky, in his 
extreme efforts to enter a Europe otherwise closed to him, was to foreshadow something on a 
much larger scale which has shaken European integration to its very core. The mass movement 
of more than a million refugees and migrants (many fleeing conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan and 
Iraq) into European countries during 20153 (the migration crisis so called), has generated an 
extreme level of disruption and disunity in the EU and its Member States as they strive to deal 
with the arrivals.4 But the crisis is, first and foremost, a humanitarian catastrophe of a sort 
unseen in Europe since the 1930s and 40s.  Images from Lesbos and Lampedusa, among others, 
bear witness to the magnitude of the human cost of the crisis, which is still growing at an 
alarming rate at the time of writing.5  This note argues that the humanitarian crisis points to 
more deep-seated and long standing problems in the governance of the European Union.  As 
the EU and its Member States struggle with the pressures of mass movement of displaced 
people, the treatment of those people exposes what can only be described as a crisis of 
European values.  It is, in many ways, a stark exposé of shortcomings in the application of 
European fundamental rights, humanitarian law, and neighbourhood policy.   
 
B. The Road to Crisis 
                                                            
* School of Law, University of Aberdeen. 
** Law School, RGU, Aberdeen.  
1 WB Yeats, “The Second Coming” in The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats (Macmillan, London, 1933) 210. 
2 P Peachey, “From Mozambique to Mortlake: The man who fell out of the sky”, The Independent, 21 
December 2012, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/from-mozambique-to-
mortlake-the-man-who-fell-out-of-the-sky-8429552.html 
3 EUROSTAT, Asylum Quarterly Report (December 2915), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Asylum_quarterly_report 
4 See further, European Commission, COM (2015) 240 A European Agenda on Migration (13 May 2015). 
5 UNHCR statistics: http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83 
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What was seen as, and conveniently categorised as, a “peripheral glitch”6, a merely local issue 
confined to the Mediterranean extremes of fortress Europe has been evolving slowly over the 
last five years before it reached an unavoidable crescendo during 2015. In 2014, Daniela 
Caruso spoke of the “lost generation” of those who had literally been lost, drowned in the 
waters of southern Europe.7 Before the origins of the current crisis began to influence the 
shaping of Member State and EU migration strategy, in about 2009/2010, EU level migration 
policy had begun to gradually move from being the precious preserve of Member State 
sovereignty into being a commonly shaped policy. The original Schengen Agreement of 19858 
which provided for the gradual abolition of internal borders in the then EEC was largely 
influenced by the demands of a free moving trading community within parts of the EEC; trade, 
for now, trumped tight territorial control. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty and its Third Pillar can 
be seen as the starting point of the evolution of a common EU migration and border control 
programme.9 In tandem, the pre-Maastricht 1990 Dublin Convention10 led to a 2003 
Community-wide agreement on the handling of asylum claims (the Dublin Regulation).11 To 
complement the procedural agreements on borders, Frontex was established for the control of 
the Union’s external borders in 2004.12 In 2013, Eurosur was created, also with the aim of 
deflecting illegal migrants from EU external borders. The whole package for “managing” Third 
Country Nationals coming to and within the EU was, or certainly seemed to be, a sleek, 
polished system, a modern bureaucratic success with its organisational efficiency, keeping 
others, non-Europeans, at bay so as to further success and progress within. 
Individual Member States have played significant and contrasting roles in the EU 
migration narrative. Germany’s perspective has been fundamental in shaping communal 
positions on immigration and asylum in Europe; it is, therefore, not surprising to see that state’s 
                                                            
6 D Caruso, “Lost at Sea” (2014) 15 German Law Journal 1197. 
7 Caruso (n 6) 1199. 
8 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of 
the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual 
Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 19.  
9 Regulation 562/2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 Establishing a 
Community Code on the Rules Governing the Movement of Persons Across Borders (Schengen Borders Code), 
2006 O.J. (L 105/1).  
10 Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum lodged in one of the 
Member States of the European Communities, 1997 O.J. (C254/1). 
11 Regulation 343/2003 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State 
Responsible for Examining an Asylum Application Lodged in One of the Member State by a Third Country 
National, 2003 O.J. (L 50/1).  
12 Council Regulation 2007/2004, Establishing the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the European Union, 2004 O.J. (L 349/1).  
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role in such a pronounced way in the current crisis. As Caruso points out, “It was in German 
political circles that the idea of Europeanizing immigration policies was born.”13 She 
characterises the original development of EU level migration policy as based on the need to 
externalise a German problem (dealing with a high levels of non-EU migrants in the 1980s)  
and redirect migrants away to other states.14 In contrast to those evolutionary stages, it might 
be said that the 2015/16 crisis has seen the externalisation of a German solution, as many other 
Member States were required to respond to the migrants flowing into Germany after the Merkel 
announcement of “all Syrians welcome”.15  
One of the states most affected specifically by the “Syrians welcome” announcement, 
and by the Mediterranean crisis in general, has been Greece. The handling of asylum seekers 
and migrants within Greece was problematic even before the situation reached crisis level in 
the spring and summer of 2015. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found Greece 
to have breached the ECHR in its treatment of an Afghan migrant in 2011.16 Malta17 and Italy18 
too have both been judged wanting by the ECtHR in terms of the human rights accorded to 
incoming migrants and the refoulement practices operated in both states. The existence of this 
jurisprudence, dating from the last 4-5 years, testifies to the fact that the values failure at 
European level has been incremental. The signs of both practical and legal breakdowns at 
Europe’s periphery were all visible but not recognised or acted upon sufficiently rapidly. 
Economic (Euro Crisis) and political (Arab spring) events both colluded to increase the 
problems in the vulnerable southern borders of the EU. 
The Schengen rules, which exist to prohibit border controls as between Member States, 
have equally been breached.  In 2013, controversial rules were introduced in response to the 
upheaval resulting from the Arab spring.19  By way of exception to the general rule, the new 
legislation allows Member States to reinstate internal border controls in the event of a failure 
to control the outer borders of the Schengen area.20  This has allowed Member States to erect 
                                                            
13 Caruso (n 6) 1201. 
14 ibid. 
15 A Hall and J Lichfield, “Germany opens its gates: Berlin says all Syrian asylum-seekers are welcome to 
remain, as Britain is urged to make a 'similar statement’”, The Independent, 24 August 2015, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-opens-its-gates-berlin-says-all-syrian-asylum-
seekers-are-welcome-to-remain-as-britain-is-10470062.html  
16 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, ECHR App. No 30696/09 (21 January 2011).  
17 Aden Ahmed v. Malta, ECHR App. No. 55352/12 (23 July 2013); Suso Muso v. Malta, ECHR App. No . 
42337/12 (23 July 2013); Louled Massoud v Malta, ECHR App. No. 24340/08 (27 July 2010). 
18 Hirsi Jamaa v Italy, ECHR App. No 27765/09 (23 February 2012); Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (no. 
16483/12) 1 September 2015. 
19 S Peers, ‘Immigration and Asylum’ in C Barnard and S Peers (eds.) European Union Law (OUP 2014) 781. 
20 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 1051/2013 OJ 2013 295/1; Council Regulation 
1051/2013 OJ 2013 295/27. 
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razor fences to impede the flow of migrants from one state to another, thereby localising and 
exacerbating a suite of problems that might better be shared and resolved in common.21  The 
introduction of the legislation was accompanied by a decision to reduce the powers of the 
European Parliament by adopting regulations under the intergovernmental Justice and Home 
Affairs procedure.22  Effectively, therefore, the response to the needs of refugees was to 
reinstate the powers of the Member States, to negate the principle of solidarity as between the 
Member States and to lead to a migration laissez-faire approach in which whoever builds the 
highest fence or stops the most asylum claims is the short term winner. All of the apparently 
carefully crafted, vital loadbearing structures of EU migration and border policy, Schengen, 
Dublin, Frontex, have now come crumbling down in spectacular fashion over the course of 
2015/16 in the face of the crisis which is still ongoing.23  
 
 
C. A Constitutional Crisis 
 
The failures in the treatment of asylum seekers appear to stem, in part, from a perception that 
migration is, first and foremost, a negative externality to be mitigated, rather than an exercise 
in the fulfilment of constitutional obligations.  Far from embracing the European principles of 
solidarity and the rule of law, several Member States appear, paradoxically, to reject those 
European principles in the face of a perceived threat to their own construction of European 
identity.  Indeed, not only have the Member States failed to fulfil their human rights obligations 
stemming from European instruments, but the Union has collectively failed in its obligation to 
share burdens internally and externally as required by the spirit, if not necessarily the letter, of 
the 1951 Geneva Convention.24    
The refusal to adopt meaningful burden sharing,25 accompanied by the reversion to physical 
impediments to movement within the Union, suggests that the horizontal relationship between 
the Member States has reverted to traditional notions of absolute territorial sovereignty.  Of 
                                                            
21 See for example ‘Hungary defends border fences blocking migrants’, France 24, 10 June 2015, available at 
http://www.france24.com/en/20150930-hungary-defends-border-fences-blocking-migrants 
22 Peers (n 19) 782. 
23 “Editorial comments: From eurocrisis to asylum and migration crisis: Some legal and institutional 
considerations about the EU’s current struggles” (2015) 52 CMLRev 1437-1450. 
24 See S Peers, ‘The Refugee Crisis: What should the EU do next? (2015), available at 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/the-refugee-crisis-what-should-eu-do.html 
25 See Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece OJ L 239/146.  For academic commentary, see Peers 
2015 (n 25). 
5 
 
course, this is by no means a uniform trend.  There are instances in which the Union has 
demonstrated a stronger commitment to constitutional safeguards for asylum seekers.  The 
judgment in NS in particular goes a long way to reordering the relationship between Member 
States by permitting them to refuse to recognise as sufficient the standards of fundamental 
rights protection in other parts of the Union.26  This marks a significant change of direction for 
a union whose record in fundamental rights protection is open to criticism.  Indeed, states with 
higher standards of fundamental rights protection have, on occasion in the past, been required 
to sacrifice those higher standards at the altar of mutual recognition.27  That this will no longer 
be the case in respect of asylum seekers is to be commended.   
Yet this does not result in common and higher standards of fundamental rights protection 
for the EU as a whole.   Rather than an agreement to adopt higher standards in all Member 
States and a robust system to assist and enforce those standards, the judgment merely allows 
recalcitrant states to transfer the burden of values that are purportedly held in common.   
Indeed, EU law lacks enforcement mechanisms in the event that the member states do not 
fulfil their obligations towards one another and towards citizens of third countries.  There is 
therefore a conflict between fundamental constitutional principles.  On the one hand, the 
Member States are notionally bound by the principle of solidarity.  On the other, the law-
making processes allow the Union to act only insofar as powers have been conferred by 
sovereign states; those states also retain control over the substance of legislation, particularly 
as regards areas that remain closely associated with the residual sovereignty of nations.  It 
follows that, despite its lofty ideals, the Union is often only as principled as the lowest common 
denominator among its constituent states.   
 
D. Prospects 
At time of writing, after over six months of facing up to the reality of the migration crisis, the 
EU’s long term commitment to fostering the bonding of its citizens,28 by entrenching external 
frontiers at the same time as removing internal border obstacles, is collapsing.29 Building up 
the privileged club for insiders for decades has generated an increasingly harder external 
border, and an increasingly harsher face towards outsiders. 
                                                            
26 Case C-411/10 N. S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] ECR I-13905 
27 Case 438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation v Viking Line ABP [2007] ECR I-10779. 
28 Caruso (n 6) 1197. 
29 Schengen and External Borders were the subject of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 25 February 
2016 (Outcome of the Council Meeting, 6462/16 (Provisional)) against the background of growing tension 
between EU Member States on the issue of migration control: BBC News, Migrant crisis: Greece recalls 
ambassador from Austria amid EU rifts, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35658776 
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It is apt also to recall that this is not the first time that European states have failed to 
respond justly and humanely to desperate people fleeing to their territories.  Echoes of the 
Évian Conference of 1938 abound in the responses of states whose establishment of the 
European Union was intended to prevent a repeat of Europe’s catastrophic failings in the 1930s 
and 40s.30 The migrants crisis highlights a Europe which has, arguably, made little real progress 
in terms of how “outsiders” are treated by and within Europe. The EU is based on the upholding 
of values such as human dignity and human rights, all of which have been found seriously 
wanting during the unfolding of this worsening situation.31 At the 18/19 February 2016 
European Council,32 there was a noticeable lack of focus on issue of rights and values. The 
discourse was again, just as at the December European Council,33 one of stemming ‘flows’ (not 
actual people), securing borders and safeguarding Schengen. Article 1 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU, and Article 6 TEU, as well as EU Member States’ international 
human rights obligations, appear to have been forgotten in the race to defend the Union from 
the migrant threat. The question is, what is being defended now? An integrated Europe without 
a clear commitment to rights and values is a Europe which has lost its very raison d’être.  
    
 
                                                            
30 For an account of the Évian Conference in its broader context, see WI Brustein and RD King, ‘Anti-Semitism 
in Europe before the Holocaust’ (2004) 25 International Political Science Review 35 at 35. 
31 Comparisons with the evolution of asylum policy in Australia, where there has been “a distinct trajectory of 
deterrence and punishment” is apt; C Tazreiter, ‘“Stop the Boats”! Externalising the borders of Australia and 
imaginary pathologies of contagion’ (2015) 29(2) JIANL 142-158. 
32 European Council Conclusions, 18-19 February 2016, EUCO 1/16 
33 European Council Conclusions, 18 December 2015, EUCO 28/15 
